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Abstract: We develop models that lend insight into how to design systems that enjoy economies of scale in their operating costs,
when those systems will subsequently face disruptions from accidents, acts of nature, or an intentional attack from a well-informed
attacker. The systems are modeled as parallel M/M/1 queues, and the key question is how to allocate service capacity among the
queues to make the system resilient to worst-case disruptions. We formulate this problem as a three-level sequential game of perfect
information between a defender and a hypothetical attacker. The optimal allocation of service capacity to queues depends on the
type of attack one is facing. We distinguish between deterministic incremental attacks, where some, but not all, of the capacity of
each attacked queue is knocked out, and zero-one random-outcome (ZORO) attacks, where the outcome is random and either all
capacity at an attacked queue is knocked out or none is. There are differences in the way one should design systems in the face of
incremental or ZORO attacks. For incremental attacks it is best to concentrate capacity. For ZORO attacks the optimal allocation is
more complex, typically, but not always, involving spreading the service capacity out somewhat among the servers. © 2011 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 58: 731–742, 2011
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this article, we model decision problems where a cen-
tralized planner, also known as the defender, wishes to design
parallel service channels (queues) with the knowledge that an
attacker (representing worst-case disruptions, either inten-
tional or otherwise) will attempt, in a single attack, to maxi-
mize disruption to the system. Economies of scale incentivize
the defender to concentrate service capacity, which seems at
odds to the goal of avoiding disruption caused by the attacker.
Our model considers situations where the attacker focuses
on server capacity. For example, in designing the hospital
network for a community one might ask whether it is better
to have two small hospitals or one large hospital. There are
often economies of scale that make a single large hospital
the more attractive option from the perspective of operating
costs. However, when one considers the potential for dis-
ruptions such as accidents or intentional attacks that could
remove some or all of a hospital’s capacity, one might not
be so quick to “put all the eggs in one basket.” Perhaps the
multiple-small-hospital solution is better in that it is more
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resilient to a range of disruptions. This argument might be
applied recursively, leading a risk-averse planner to prefer
many small hospitals to one large one. Other situations sup-
ported by our model are jamming of wireless communication
networks, where the attacker increases the noise to signal
ratio, de facto reducing server capacity, and physical attacks
on server farms for national security data.
We model the service channels as M/M/1 queues, where
capacity is synonymous with the service rates of the queues.
We model the competition between the defender and attacker
as a three-stage sequential game of perfect information. In
the first stage, the defender chooses the initial service rates
of the parallel queues. In the second stage the attacker, with
full knowledge of the service rates of the parallel queues,
then attacks the queues, reducing the service rates. In the
third and final stage, the defender then routes traffic through
the queues, attempting to maximize throughput subject to a
bound on the mean steady-state volume of traffic in the sys-
tem. This bound on the mean steady-state volume of traffic in
the system is meant to capture the defender’s desire to ensure
a certain quality of service for customers of the service sys-
tem, while also allowing us to capture the economies of scale
in queueing systems.
© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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Our model only considers the case in which an adver-
sary will attack our network of queues once; if the defender
believes that the attacker is capable of sustaining a campaign
of repeated attacks over a long time horizon then our model
is not appropriate. An analysis based on a repeated game
might be slightly better suited to the situation, but we are
of the opinion that, in a case where the attacker has such
resources at his disposal, both the attacker and defender are
probably concerned with larger, strategic issues, and that
the defense of one set of servers would only constitute a
small part of a much larger conflict. In such a case, the opti-
mal allocation of scarce defensive resources among different
sites would require a different (although almost certainly still
game-theoretic) model.
We break up our analysis of the three-stage sequential
game between defender and attacker by analyzing the last,
or innermost, stage first. This is the traffic routing, or flow
allocation, problem, and will be solved by the defender after
the capacity allocation decision has been made by him, and
also after the attacker makes any capacity reduction deci-
sion. After we determine characteristics of solutions to this
innermost problem, we move one step outward to formulate
the attacker’s problem of determining optimal service rate
reduction, and the corresponding optimal routing, for a given
(fixed) capacity allocation by the defender. Finally, we ana-
lyze the entire problem of determining the optimal capacity
assignment, given that for any capacity allocation an optimal
capacity reducing attack, and its corresponding optimal flow
allocation, will follow.
Steady-state analysis is used throughout for simplicity.
Indeed, explicit expressions for the mean steady-state vol-
ume of traffic are available, and thuswe can obtain a complete
solution to the sequential game. If we were to attempt to use
transient analysis, our results would necessarily depend on
the initial state of any queues and other very specific infor-
mation that seems overly detailed given that our goal is to
obtain insights from a stylized model.
Extensions to this model could include actions like repair
of attacked queues. We elect not to take that path because the
current model is already challenging to analyze, and reveals
important insights that are the goal of the article.
As we will show, the optimal initial allocation of capac-
ity among the service channels by the defender depends on
the types of disruptions, or “attacks,” that are expected. We
consider two types of attacks.
Incremental attacks involve a deterministic reduction in the
service capacity of queues selected by the attacker. The total
reduction in service capacity is constrained. Such attacks are
meant to model small-scale attacks on structures that may
leave the structure still partially functional. For example, a
hospital may still be able to function, albeit with a limited set
of services, if some but not all of its wards are rendered unus-
able through destruction or contamination. Similarly, a bridge
may still conduct a limited traffic flow if some of its lanes are
rendered unusable. For incremental attacks we find, perhaps
surprisingly, that the defender’s optimal first-stage decision
is to concentrate all capacity in one of the queues. Upon
reflection this is quite intuitive, because the defender attempts
to maximize throughput subject to a bound on the mean
steady-state number of customers in the system (mean occu-
pancy). Larger-capacity queues exhibit economies of scale
with respect to mean occupancy, and so all else being equal,
the defender prefers to concentrate capacity. Since incremen-
tal attacks simply reduce capacity by a fixed amount, it is
optimal for the defender to concentrate capacity.
A well-equipped attacker may be able to wreak more
destruction than we model with incremental attacks, so we
also consider zero-one random-outcome (ZORO) attacks.
Here the attacker may divide attacking effort between mul-
tiple queues. With some probability, related to the attacker’s
effort and the capacity of the queue that is being attacked,
the queue’s service capacity is entirely lost, but otherwise it
remains fully functional. Again the defender wishes to maxi-
mize throughput subject to a bound on the mean steady-state
volume of traffic in the system. The optimal first-stage deci-
sion for the defender often involves distributing the service
capacity more than for incremental attacks as intuition might
suggest, although there are situationswhere it is again optimal
to concentrate capacity.
Our work is an outgrowth of Brown et al. [4], where 3-
stage sequential games are used to analyze various potential
attacks. In contrast to that work, we dealmainlywith continu-
ous decision variables and nonlinear mathematical programs.
Refs. 8 and 14 compare strategies for preparing for “proba-
bilistic” and “strategic” threats. Probabilistic threats are those
that arise from chance alone such as natural disasters, while
strategic threats arise from design such as through terrorist
attacks. Our analysis can be viewed as further work on strate-
gic threats, where we distinguish different types of strategic
threats, and is similar to Bier et al. [3] in the sense that we
develop insights through stylized models. The distinction
between probabilistic and strategic threats has been stud-
ied for some time; see, e.g., Garrick [7], and game theory
is accepted as a useful theoretical framework to study strate-
gic threats; see the survey Bier [2]. The models described
in Woo [13] and Major [10] are similar in some respects
to our ZORO model, with that of Woo [13] suggesting that
low-utility targets are more attractive for attack, and that
of Major [10] suggesting that successful attacks are more
likely to be on smaller targets than larger ones. Paté-Cornell
and Guikema [11] describe a comprehensive computational
framework using influence diagrams to prioritize threats and
countermeasures.
Our analysis is also related to existing results in queue-
ing theory. In particular, the third stage of our analysis of
incremental attacks is similar to the flow assignment problem
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described in Kleinrock [9, p. 340]. Kleinrock treats general
networks, and therefore gives an algorithmic solution due
to Fratta et al. [6]. In contrast we have a (very) specific
network and are therefore able to give an explicit solution.
Our inner problem is also similar to Kleinrock’s capacity-
assignment problemwhere the flows are given and onewishes
to choose capacities, but the capacity-assignment problem
is more straightforward. The observation that some queues
will remain unused in the third stage of our analysis of
incremental attacks is similar to a well-known phenomenon
in queues with multiple heterogeneous servers where suffi-
ciently slow servers remain unused; see, e.g., Rubinovitch
[12] and Cabral [5].
Relative to these earlier contributions, the key contribu-
tions of our work are that we analyze models that describe
how to design parallel service systems that exhibit economies
of scale, in that larger systems are more efficient than smaller
systems, in the face of attacks of different types, and we show
that the defender’s design decisions are heavily influenced by
the type of attacks they anticipate.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In
Section 2 we analyze deterministic incremental attacks on
queues. Section 3 deals with zero-one random attacks on
queues, and in Section 4 we present the conclusions of the
article.
2. INCREMENTAL ATTACKS ON QUEUES
Consider n parallel M/M/1 queues, where the ith queue
has mean arrival rate λi and service rate µi , i = 1, . . . , n.
Throughout, we assume that the goal of the defender, who
operates the queues, is to adjust the arrival rates to the servers
so as to maximize the total throughput,
∑
i λi , with a restric-
tion on the total mean steady-state number of jobs in the
system, Q. We can therefore define the feasible region for the
arrival rate vector asL = {λi ≥ 0 : ∑ni=1 λi/(µi −λi) ≤ Q}.
If we define λ as the vector of arrival rates, the defender’s






We have made the modeling choice of allowing the
defender to select the service rates subject to a bound on the
expected number of jobs in the system. This setup reflects
the situation where the defender has considerable flexibility
and control over how to direct traffic to the various queues.
We impose a bound on the mean steady-state number of jobs
in the system, which is similar in effect to bounding the total
traffic that can be routed through the queues, but in contrast
to bounding the total traffic it also reflects the economies of
scale present in queueing systems.
We can rewrite the optimization problem (1) from the point
of view that choosing an arrival rate for a queue is equiva-
lent to choosing the mean steady-state number of jobs in the
queue, and make a change of variables qi = λi/(µi − λi)
to represent the problem in terms of q, the vector of queue
lengths. The feasible region for q is the simplex Q = {qi ≥
0 :
∑n
i=1 qi ≤ Q}, and the resulting optimization problem







1 + qi . (2)
We now posit an attacker who can modify the service rates




µi = M ,
for some (predetermined) M > 0. Letting µ denote the vec-
tor of service rates, we can represent this constraint, together
with the requirement that µ be nonnegative, as µ ∈ M for
an appropriately defined simplex M. Given the attacker’s
selection of service rates, the defender then selects the mean
number of jobs q to attempt to maximize the total throughput
through the queues, subject to a bound on the mean steady-
state number of jobs in the full system. The optimization











1 + qi .
2.1. Solving the Inner Problem
Consider the innermaximization, where the goal is to com-
pute g(µ) for a fixed µ. The feasible region Q is convex,
and the objective function is strictly concave in q. There-
fore, a unique global maximum exists. For now suppose that
µ ∈ M is fixed. We assume, without loss of generality, that
µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µn.
The vector (q∗,w∗) ∈ Rn+1 is an optimal solution-
Lagrangemultiplier pair if and only ifw∗ ≥ 0,w∗(∑ni=1 q∗i −
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holds; see pp. 490 of Bertsekas [1] for the general theory. Due











for i = 1, . . . , n.





)1/2 − 1 if µi > w
0 if µi ≤ w , (5)
where we define qi(0) = ∞. If we assume the first k servers
receive traffic, then forcing the condition w(
∑n
i=1 qi(w) −









and, defining ν(k) = ∑ki=1 √µi , we get (cf. Eq. (5))
k∗ = max
{





is the index of the smallest (i.e., slowest) server that gets any
traffic. The ordering assumption of the µi’s guarantees that
k∗ is well-defined.
To recap, we have w(k∗) > 0, qi(w(k∗)) satisfies Eq. (5),
and w(k∗)(
∑k∗
i=1 qi(w(k∗)) − Q) = 0. We have shown the
following result.
PROPOSITION 1: The optimal solution to the inner max-







ν(k∗) − 1 if i ≤ k∗
0 if i > k∗
. (6)
The optimal solution is interesting in that it does not neces-
sarily use all of the servers. Specifically, it may ignore servers
with a very low service rate. This follows because the mar-
ginal costs (measured in mean steady-state volume of traffic)
are the same for all servers, and the traffic is initially allo-
cated to servers for which the marginal gain in throughput is
largest. Since the derivative with respect to qi of the function
µiqi/(1 + qi) at 0 is µi , this means that the large servers are
the first to get any traffic.
2.2. Solving the Outer Problem
If we substitute the result of Proposition 1 into the objec-
tive function of (2), we get that the optimal objective value









Q + k(µ) , (7)
where we write λ(µ) and k(µ) for the solution of the inner
problem corresponding to a given µ ∈ M. This is a nontriv-
ial optimization problem, because the summation index k(µ)
in (7) depends on µ.
The proof is constructive, and works as follows. We start
with an arbitrary solution µ ∈ M with µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥
µn ≥ 0 and “smooth” the service rates so that the objec-
tive function continuously decreases, eventually reaching the
equal-rate solution. In essence, we provide a path from any
arbitrary µ to the equal-rate solution where the objective
function increases along the path. The smoothing increases
the minimal service rates and decreases the maximal service
rates in such a way that the sum of the rates remains con-
stant. The smoothing continues until all of the service rates
are equal.
More precisely, suppose that there are m maxima among
µ1, . . . ,µn, i.e.,µ1 = · · · = µm > µm+1,wherem < n. Sup-
pose further that there are  minima among µ1, . . . ,µn, i.e.,
µn− > µn−+1 = · · · = µn, where  > 0. We then decrease
the maximal service rates at a single rate, and increase the
minimal service rates at a (possibly different) single rate so
that M , the sum of the rates, remains constant. We continue
this smoothing until one of two stopping conditions arises.
One such condition is that the set of maxima, or minima, gets
larger. In this case, we simply adjust m or  and continue.
We need the following lemma related to the smoothing
operation, the proof of which may be found in the Appendix.
LEMMA 1: Let x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xj ≥ 0 and let ,m > 0




xi − δ i ≤ m
xi m < i ≤ j − 
xi + mδ j −  < i ≤ j ,
, (8)
so that the sum of the components in y and x are identi-
cal. Here δ > 0 is small enough that the components of y
remain nonnegative and ordered from largest to smallest. Let
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We now show that smoothing can only increase k(µ), the
number of servers that receive nonzero traffic. The proof may
be found in the Appendix.
LEMMA 2: Let µ ∈ M with µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µn. Then
smoothingµ in themanner described above can only increase
k(µ).
We now show that the attacker’s optimal strategy is to bal-
ance the service rates. We provide a constructive proof that
builds on the smoothing ideas in the Appendix. The proof
shows that the optimal solution is unique and, moreover,
yields the insight that the attacker can continuously improve
the objective function through smoothing of the service rates.
PROPOSITION 2: The solution to (3) isµ1 = · · · = µn =
M/n.
PROOF: Let µ ∈ M with µ1 ≥ · · · ≥ µn, and suppose
that the n rates are not all equal.
If k(µ) = n, then smoothing leaves k(µ) = n, the sum
of the µi’s remains constant, and Lemma 1 (with j = n)
shows that ν(n) increases. Therefore, from (7) we see that
g decreases until the smoothing completes with the service
rates being all equal.
If k(µ) = m, the number of maximal service rates, so that




Q + m =
Qmµ1
Q + m
which decreases as µ1 decreases, at least until k(µ) is poised
to increase.
Suppose that m < k(µ) ≤ n − , and let k = k(µ). Let
x = µ and let y be the smoothed x as in (8). Then smooth-
ing decreases the first m (maximal) components of x by δ,
while components m+1 through n− are unchanged. Then,
defining S = ∑ki=m+1 √xi , we see that






x1 − δ + S)2
Q+ k
= −mδ + m
2δ
Q+ k +
2mS(√x1 −√x1 − δ)
Q+ k .
(9)





x1 − δ) ≤ (k −m)
√
x1 − δ(√x1 −
√
x1 − δ)




x(x − a) − (x − a) < a/2 for 0 < a < x
then shows that (10) is bounded above by (k−m)δ/2. This,
together with (9), establishes that
g(y) − g(x) ≤ −mδ + m
2δ





establishing that g decreases while smoothing, at least until
k(µ) is poised to increase.
It is possible that several arrival rates are simultaneously
poised to become positive, i.e.,
ν(k + j) − (Q + k + j)√µk+j = 0
for j = 1, . . . , j ∗, and that this is not true for j = j ∗ + 1.
From (7) and the fact that λ(µ) is continuous in µ we see that





2(k + j ∗)
Q + k + j ∗ .
The argument we have already given establishes that this
expression decreases as the smoothing progresses. Therefore,
g continues to decrease as we move through points where
k(µ) increases, and this completes the proof. 
2.3. Upper Bounds on the Service Rates
In the previous sections, we studied a version of our prob-
lem where the attacker could allocate service capacity arbi-
trarily across the n servers. In general however, the attacker
attacks an established system with current service rates given
by the vector µ˜, say. We assume, without loss of generality,
that µ˜1 ≥ · · · ≥ µ˜n. The attack then takes the form of reduc-
ing the service rate vector. We constrain the attacker so that
the sum of the service rate reductions is some constant M˜ .
Define M = ∑ni=1 µ˜i − M˜ and redefine the feasible region
for the outer optimization to be
M =
{






The difference with our previous analysis is that we now have
upper bounds on the individual service rates.
The solution remains almost exactly the same as before.
The attacker’s optimal strategy is to attack the fastest
server(s), leaving the defender with a system where the ser-
vice rates are as equal as possible, modulo the upper bound
constraints on µ.
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PROPOSITION 3: The optimal solution to the upper-
bounded version of the problem is to set µi = µ˜i for i > k∗
and
















 /k ≤ µ˜k

 .
The proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix follows the
same lines as the smoothing proof of Proposition 2, except
that service rates are increased only until they hit their bounds
and are then fixed.
2.4. Preparing for Incremental Attacks
Now consider the defender’s initial choice of configuration
µ˜ of ann-server systemas a third, outermost layer to the prob-
lem. The interpretation is as follows: The defender chooses
an initial configuration µ˜with total service capacity, know-
ing that an attacker will subsequently reduce the total service
capacity to M ≤  in an attempt to minimize the throughput
the defender can achieve after the attack. Theorem 1 below
shows that the optimal design from the defender’s perspec-
tive is to concentrate capacity. The proof yields the insight
that the defender can monotonically improve the three-level
objective function to the optimal value from any configura-
tion by concentrating capacity in a certain way. Let f (µ˜)
be the objective value associated with the solution given in
Proposition 3.




i=1 µ˜i = 
µ˜ ≥ 0
is to concentrate all server capacity into one arbitrary server.
PROOF: We begin from an arbitrary µ˜ (assuming, with-
out loss of generality, that µ˜1 ≥ µ˜2 ≥ · · · ≥ µ˜n) that is
nonnegative and sums to  and perform a “reverse smooth-
ing,” whereby the minimal positive service rate µ˜j is reduced
to zero while µ˜1 simultaneously increases, giving µ˜′ say.
Proposition 3 gives the form of the optimal solutions, µ and
µ′ say, corresponding to µ˜ and µ˜′ respectively. Then µ′i = 0
for i ≥ j . Furthermore, the maximal rates of µ that are not
hard on their bounds µ˜ are strictly increased in µ′. This is
again a form of smoothing, and an application of our ear-
lier results on smoothing establishes that g(µ) ≤ g(µ′),
i.e., f (µ˜) ≤ f˜ (µ′). We continue this reverse smoothing,
continuously increasing f until µ˜1 = . 
Theorem 1 establishes that the max-min-max configura-
tion is to have a single, very large, server. This is the complete
opposite of the (perhaps more intuitive) solution where the
service capacity is spread equally among the n servers. To
understand why this is optimal, note that the attacker attacks
service capacity, attempting to equalize the service rates as
much as possible. By ensuring that a single queue holds the
entire service capacity, no equalization is possible, and the
system capacity remains concentrated (but reduced) in a sin-
gle queue. This leads to the efficiency that arises from using
a single fast server as opposed to several slower servers that
is a classical result in queueing theory. Essentially we are
taking advantage of the economies of scale that are present
in high-capacity service systems.
But what if an attacker were to completely wipe out the
first server? The answer is that our formulation considered
incremental attacks where the service capacities are reduced
by a given total amount, so that completely destroying a sin-
gle fast server is not possible. But in many settings, attacks
do have the capability to destroy an entire service channel.
3. ZERO-ONE RANDOM-OUTCOME (ZORO)
ATTACKS
Now suppose that there are n service channels with capac-
ities given by the vector µ. The attacker again attacks these
service channels, with the result that either the entire channel
is destroyed (with probability pi), or it remains untouched
(with probability 1 − pi). The outcomes of the attacks on
different service channels are independent. A fraction xi of
the attacker’s total effort is allocated to service channel i, and
pi is a function p(xi ,µi).
The optimization problem we now consider is how the
defender allocates server capacity, knowing that the attacker
allocates effort to minimize the expected throughput and the
defender gets to respond by maximizing the throughput sub-
ject to a constraint on the mean steady-state number of jobs




i=1 xi ≤ 1
0 ≤ xi ≤ x¯(µi) ∀i,
(11)
where g is defined in (7), µr is the random vector of remain-
ing capacities after the attacks, and x¯(µi) = inf{x ≥ 0 :
p(x,µi) = 1}. We can write
µr = (µ1I (U1 > p1), . . . ,µnI(Un > pn)),
where (U1, . . . ,Un) is a vector of i.i.d. U(0, 1) random vari-
ables and I (·) is the indicator function that equals 1 if its
Naval Research Logistics DOI 10.1002/nav
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argument is true and 0 otherwise. Let V = {(xi ,µi) :
0 ≤ xi ≤ min{1, x¯(µi)}, 0 ≤ µi ≤ M} be the two-
dimensional set formed by all possible effort/capacity com-
binations. Throughout this section we make the following
assumption:
(A1) Over V , the function p is differentiable in xi and µi ,
increasing as a function of xi , and decreasing with µi .
Assumption (A1) is intended to capture the plausible
notions that the destruction probability p should be increas-
ing in the attacker’s effort xi and decreasing in the queue
capacity µi . One could argue for other relationships between
destruction probability and queue capacity, but this seems to
be a reasonable starting point. It follows from the definition
that x¯(·) is concave inµi whenp is a (jointly) convex function
that meets assumption (A1).
Evidently, a positive resource allocation xi > 0 may be
optimal only if µi > 0. Hence, when the defender has a sin-
gle large server, only that server is bound to be attacked. This
can be used to obtain a lower bound for Problem (11), because
in this situation the defender can never have an expected
throughput smaller than (1−p(1,M))M/(1+ 1/Q), where
M/(1+ 1/Q) is the largest allowable single-server through-
put in Q. On the other hand, the defender can never have
an expected throughput larger than M/(1 + 1/Q). This fol-
lowsbecause having a single large servermaximizes expected
throughput when all service capacity remains intact (e.g.,















for some i = 1, . . . , n, and the latter equals M/(1 + Q−1).
Hence, having a single server with maximal rate M is
defender-optimal when there are no attacks. We summarize
these results in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 4: The solution of Problem (11) is
bounded by
(1 − p(1,M)) M
1 + 1/Q ≤ maxµ∈Mminx E[g(µ
r)] ≤ M
1 + 1/Q .
Whenp(1,M) is small, Proposition 4 shows that it is nearly
optimal for the defender to concentrate its capacity into one
server. However, when p(1,M) is close to 1, having a sin-
gle large server is not necessarily defender optimal. Consider
for instance the case p(1,M) = 1 and p(1/2,M/2) < 1, as
could occurwhenp(x,µ) is convex in both arguments. In this
case E[g(µr)] = 0 if µ1 = M , and setting µ1 = µ2 = M/2
results in













1 + Q [p(x,M/2)(1 − p(1 − x,M/2))
+ (1 − p(x,M/2))p(1 − x,M/2)




1 + Q(1 − p(x,M/2)p(1 − x,M/2)) > 0
for any x ∈ [0, 1], since p(1/2,M/2) < 1 and (A1) imply
that either p(x,M/2) < 1 or p(1−x,M/2) < 1. Therefore,
the defender is better off by allocating capacity to at least two
servers. We should point out, however, that in the extreme
case where p(y, yM) = 1 for all 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, the attacker
destroys all servers regardless of the allocation µ chosen by
the defender. This follows because setting xi = µi/M leads
to p(µi/M ,µi) = 1 (with µi/M taking the place of y), and
E[g(µr)] = 0.
3.1. Simplifying ZORO: Unconstrained Queue
Lengths
The analysis of the full ZORO case appears difficult, so
to get some insight we simplify the model. Suppose that the
ultimate goal is to maximize the expected throughput of the
system, ignoring the length of the queues. In a sense, this
regime arises as we let the bound on the mean steady-state
number in system q → ∞. It is also a reasonable approx-
imation when all of the service rates are large, because the
difference between the service rate µ1 of a queue and the
optimal flow as computed earlier is of the order √µ1, which
is small relative to µ1 when µ1 is large.
Our simplified problem is then to select the service rates









i=1 xi ≤ 1
0 ≤ xi ≤ x¯(µi) ∀i,
(12)














which allows for a closed form solution, as we shall momen-
tarily demonstrate.
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We analyze two cases: (i) p(xi ,µi) is convex in xi and µi
over V and (ii) p(xi ,µi) is concave in xi and µi over V . In the
former scenario concentrating attack resources yields higher
expected damage, while diversifying attack resources ismore
appealing in the latter. This suggests that the defender is bet-
ter off spreading out its capacity in case (i) and consolidating
server capacity in case (ii).
While the scenarios about p are expressed jointly in terms
of the attacker effort xi and capacity µi , p(·,µi) is a man-
ifestation of the attacker’s organizational capabilities and
training, and p(xi , ·) depends on the physical resilience of
the server (e.g., hospital or bridge) and on the kinetics of the
attacking device. Therefore, when treated separately,p(·,µi)
convex in xi appears when the attacker enjoys increasing rate
of benefits (in terms of probability of destroying capacity)
in his effort; this is plausible for relatively small groups of
attackers, but less so for large groups. The case p(xi , ·) con-
vex means that p(xi ,µi) grows at an increasing rate as µi
decreases, which may take place when the server’s physical
resistance weakens faster than its capacity µi .
We start by considering the attacker’s problem, using dual-
ity to obtain the optimal attacker resource allocation, as in
Section 2.1. In preparation, to break symmetry and without
loss of generality we impose an ordering on the service rates
µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µn. Let  = max{j ≥ 1 : ∑ji=1 x¯(µj ) ≤
1} be the maximum number of queues that can be knocked
out completely if the attacker attacks the largest targets first,
with  = 0 if x¯(µ1) > 1.
The vector (x∗,w∗) ∈ Rn+1 is an optimal solution-
Lagrangemultiplier pair if and only ifw∗ ≥ 0,w∗(∑ni=1 x∗i −
1) = 0, and the Lagrange condition





(µip(xi ,µi) − w∗xi) + w∗
}
holds. Since the objective function is separable, the Lagrange
condition becomes
x∗i = arg max0≤xi≤x¯(µi ){µip(xi ,µi) − w
∗xi}, i = 1, . . . , n.
(13)
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose assumption (A1) holds. If∑n
i=1 x¯(µi) ≤ 1 then x∗i = x¯(µi), for i = 1, . . . , n. Oth-
erwise, if p(xi ,µi) is convex in xi and µi over V and the




x¯(µi) for i = 1, . . . , 
1 −∑i=1 x¯(µi) for i =  + 1
0 for i =  + 2, . . . , n
, (14)
where  is defined as above to be the maximum number of
queues that can be knocked out completely if the attacker
attacks the largest targets first.
PROOF: The first statement is true because the attacker
gets to destroy all the servers when
∑n
i=1 x¯(µi) ≤ 1, which
is the best possible attack.
Otherwise, set w∗ = µ+1p(x∗+1,µ+1)/x∗+1 if x+1 > 0,
and w∗ = µp(x∗ ,µ)/x∗ if x+1 = 0; in either case we get
0 < w∗ < ∞ and w∗(∑ni=1 x∗i − 1) = 0. Observe that p
convex means that the solution to problem (13) is an extreme
point.
If x+1 = 0, the assumptions about p imply that
µip(xi ,µi)/xi ≤ w∗ for any i >  and any feasible xi > 0,
and µip(x∗i ,µi)/x∗i ≥ w∗ for any i ≤ . Therefore setting
xi = 0 for i >  and xi = x¯(µi) for i ≤  is a solution to
problem (13).
The case x+1 > 0 can be handled analogously: p con-
vex and the expected damage increasing with µ implies that
µip(xi ,µi)/xi ≤ w∗ for any i >  + 1 and any feasible
xi > 0, and µip(x∗i ,µi)/x∗i ≥ w∗ for any i ≤  + 1. Hence,
setting xi = 0 for i >  + 1, xi = x¯(µi) for i ≤ , and
x+1 = 1 −∑i=1 x¯(µi) is a solution to problem (13). 
As a result of attacking according to (14), the defender












remaining server capacity. Hence, in the outermost layer of
the problem the defender selects the initial configuration
to maximize h(µ) over µ ∈ M knowing that the attacker
follows (14).
Theorem 2 below treats the outer layer problem. To
simplify notation, let  := (µ) and ∗ := (µ∗).
THEOREM 2: Suppose assumption (A1) holds, that
p(xi ,µi) is convex in xi and µi over V , and that µi p(xi ,µi)
is nondecreasing in µi . Then a solution to the optimization
problem (12) is µ∗i = M/n for all i’s.
PROOF: We will show that h(µ∗) ≥ h(µ) for an arbitrary
server configuration µ = µ∗, in three different scenarios of
increasing complexity: (i)  = (µ) = n; (ii)  = 0; and (iii)
0 <  < n.
In Scenario (i) we have h(µ) = 0 so any feasible allocation
cannot further decrease h.
In Scenario (ii), Proposition 5 leads to x¯(µ1) > 1 and
h(µ) = M − µ1p(1,µ1). Since x¯(·) is concave, Jensen’s
inequality shows thatnx¯(µ∗1) ≥
∑n
i=1 x¯(µi). Hence x¯(µ∗1) >
1/n and ∗ = 1/x¯(µ∗1) < n. We thus have
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since µi p(xi ,µi) is nondecreasing in µi and µ1 ≥ µ∗1.
Equations (17) and (18) result in h(µ∗) ≥ h(µ).
In Scenario (iii), suppose that x∗(µ+1) = 0, so no
server is attacked to less than assured destruction. Let
µ˜i = 1/∑j=1 µj for j = 1, . . . , , and µ˜i = 1/(n −
)
∑n
j=+1 µj for i =  + 1, . . . , n. We will show that




x¯(µi) = 1, (19)
the latter since x∗(µ+1) = 0. Hence, the effort required to
destroy the first  servers under µ˜ cannot be smaller than 1,
which is the effort needed to destroy the same servers under
µ, allowing us to conclude that h(µ˜) ≥ h(µ).




) ≥  ∑
i=1




We must have (n− )∑ni=+1 x¯(µ˜i) > 0 because  < n and,
by Eq. (19), x¯(µ∗1) > 1/n. Thus ∗ = 1/x¯(µ∗1) < n and
(16) holds true. On the other hand Proposition 5 results in







































































































































































































Naval Research Logistics DOI 10.1002/nav
740 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 58 (2011)
since µi p(xi ,µi) is non-decreasing in µi and µ˜1 ≥ µ∗1.
Putting together Eqs. (22) and (23) results in h(µ∗) ≥ h(µ˜).
The proof of Scenario (iii) with x∗(µ+1) > 0 goes along
the same lines as the preceding, and is omitted. 
Thus we find that unlike the incremental attack setting dis-
cussed in Section 2, if the attacker’s ability to cause damage
meets the conditions of Theorem 2 then the defender is better
off by diversifying server capacity. Recall that the destruction
probabilityp(xi ,µi) is assumed to be decreasing inµi . If this
probability decreases too rapidly, then the optimal solution
will be to concentrate capacity. Indeed, this can happen if
the destruction probability reaches zero for sufficiently small
queue capacities (and therefore all larger queue capacities).
Thus we require an assumption that the destruction proba-
bility does not decrease too rapidly, and so we assume that
µip(xi ,µi) is nondecreasing in µi for each fixed xi . This
quantity is the expected amount of destroyed capacity in a
queue with capacity µi for a fixed attacker effort xi , and we
are assuming this is nondecreasing in the queue capacity.
If, on the other hand, p is jointly concave in xi and µi over
V , then the defender stands to gain by concentrating capacity
because then the difficulty in destroying a target increases
slower than the capacity of a target increases. This result is
stated in Theorem 3 below; its proof follows along the lines
of that of Theorem 2, and is consequently omitted.
THEOREM 3: Suppose assumption (A1) holds, that
p(xi ,µi) is jointly concave in xi and µi over V , and that
µi p(xi ,µi) is non-increasing in µi . Then a solution to the
optimization problem (12) is µ∗1 = M and µ∗2 = · · · =
µ∗n = 0.
It follows that, under the assumptions of Theorem 3,
both zero-one random outcome and incremental attacks
yield the same result; namely, concentrating capacity is
defender-optimal.
4. DISCUSSION
If a defender’s main concern is incremental attacks, as
might be the case when potential attackers are viewed as not
possessing large-scale destructive capability, then concentrat-
ing capacity to take advantage of the resulting economies of
scale is optimal. This sort of situation might arise in design-
ing hospital systems for example, where small-scale attacks
that could destroy some, but not all, of the service capacity
of a hospital are considered far more likely than large-scale
attacks that could destroy an entire hospital.
For ZORO attacks, as might arise with more capable
attackers, the optimal defender design depends on whether
the probability of taking down a server is convex or concave
in the effort and server capacity. If it is convex (in the effort xi
and capacity µi) then the attacker finds it worthwhile to con-
centrate the attacks and the defender responds by completely
distributing capacity. If, instead, the probability of succeed-
ing to destroy a server is concave in the attacker’s effort and in
the server capacity, then the diminishing returns from larger
attacks incentivizes the attacker to distribute their attacks,
and the defender responds by concentrating capacity. So the
situation with ZORO attacks is quite complex, and depends
on the structure of the function p(xi ,µi).
One might also consider the case where p is concave and
increasing in the effort xi , and convex and decreasing in
the capacity µi , reflecting diminishing returns to both large
attacks and to concentrating capacity to discourage attacks.
This case appears to be far more complex than the situations
we have treated, andwe have found through numerical exper-
iments that either concentration or diversification of capacity
canbe optimal dependingon the specific formof the functions
involved.
The question of which of these forms for p is the most
appropriate for modeling deliberate attacks is somewhat
debatable and depends heavily on the context. For example,
onemight assume diminishing returns from attacker effort, so
thatp is concave inx. But one could also argue that an attacker
needs to gather sufficient resources to mount an attack that
has any chance whatsover of success, so that p is convex in
the attacker’s effort x. The question ofwhich of these assump-
tions is most appropriate seems to depend somewhat on the
capability of the attacker. For example, it seems unlikely that
an attacker would possess sufficient material to make multi-
ple radiological weapons, which would suggest that in such
a setting p would be convex in attacker effort. With regard
to how p depends on the service capacity µ, it seems plau-
sible that as capacity µ increases, that p would asymptote
toward zero, which would suggest that p should be convex in
µ, at least eventually. However, in some settings p may not
depend heavily on the size of the service capacity for small
service capacities, so that p may be initially concave, and
only become convex for larger capacities. Our analysis does
not shed light on such situations, except when the capacities
are constrained to a region of either concavity or convexity,
but not both.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: For i ≤ m, let si denote the (non-negative) slope
of the line segment joining (yi ,h(yi)) to (xi ,h(xi)), and for i > k −  let
si denote the (nonnegative) slope of the line segment joining (xi ,h(xi)) to
(yi ,h(yi)). (We leave the si ’s undefined for m + 1 ≤ i ≤ j − .) Since h is










































where the inequality follows since the si ’s are increasing in i. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: First note that any servers with equal service
rates receive the same quantity of traffic. This follows since the function
λ/(µ − λ) is convex in λ. Equally distributing any arrivals to equal-rate
servers reduces the collective mean number of customers in the system.
Therefore, either k(µ) = m, m < k(µ) ≤ n − , or k(µ) = n, where 
and m are the number of servers with minimal and maximal service rates,
respectively.
Recall that
k(µ) = max{1 ≤ k ≤ n : ν(k) − (Q + k)√µk < 0}.
If k(µ) = m, then, since µ1 = · · · = µm throughout the smoothing
operation,
ν(m) − (Q + m)√µm = −Q√µm < 0.
Hence, k(µ) cannot decrease below m.
Suppose m < k(µ) ≤ n − , and let k denote the initial value of k(µ).
During the process of smoothing, and before k(µ) changes value, the rates
µ1, . . . ,µm decrease, so that ν(k) decreases, while (Q+ k)µk remains con-
stant. It follows that ν(k)−(Q+k)√µk remains strictly negative. Therefore,
k(µ) cannot decrease below k.
Finally, suppose that k(µ) = n. Let x = µ and suppose that we smooth x
by δ to give y, as in (8) (with j = n). Let ν(n, x) be the value ν(n) evaluated
at x, and define ν(n, y) similarly. Then, from (24) (with j = n),
ν(n, y) − ν(n, x) = mδ(sxn − sx1−δ),
where sxn and sx1−δ are the slopes of chords of the function
√· between xn
and xn + mδ, and x1 − δ and x1, respectively. Now, x1 − δ ≥ xn + mδ,
and so sxn ≥ sx1−δ . So finally,
ν(n, y) − (Q + n)√yn − [ν(n, x) − (Q + n)√xn]
= mδ(sxn − sx1−δ) − (Q + n)(
√
yn − √xn)
= mδ(sxn − sx1−δ) − (Q + n)mδsxn
≤ mδ( − (Q + n))sxn
≤ 0
since  ≤ n and Q > 0. Therefore, ν(n) − (Q + n)√µn can only decrease
during smoothing. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: We follow the proof of Proposition 2
closely. Recall that we assume the ordering µ˜1 ≥ µ˜2 ≥ · · · ≥ µ˜n on
the upper bounds. Let µ ∈M be an arbitrary feasible solution. We smooth
µ in the usual way, uniformly decreasing the maximal values and uniformly
increasing the minimial values that are not at their bounds, in such a way
that the sum of the components remains fixed at M . We will show that this
smoothing continuously decreases g. Eventually, we will arrive at a solution
where all maximal rates are equal, and cannot be decreased further without
violating the bounds on the smaller rates. Since the bounds µ˜i are decreasing
in i, it immediately follows that this is the solution given in the statement of
the proposition.
Let µ ∈ M be given. Let π denote the permutation corresponding to
decreasing order of the elements of µ (breaking ties in order of µ˜), so that
µπ(1) is the largest of the values in µ and µπ(n) is the minimal value in µ.
Let m be the number of maximal elements of µ, b be the number of min-
imal values in µ that are also at their bounds,  be the number of minimal
elements of µ that are not at their bounds, and d = n − m −  − b be the
number of values of µ that lie strictly between the maximal and minimal val-
ues. Hence, in decreasing order, the maximal elements are µπ(1), . . . ,µπ(m),
the intermediate elements are µπ(m+1), . . . ,µπ(m+d), the minimal elements
not at their bounds are µπ(m+d+1), . . . ,µπ(m+d+) and µn−b+j = µ˜n−b+j
for j = 1, 2, . . . , b are the minimal elements at their bounds. (The mini-
mal elements that are at their bounds are indeed the last b elements, so that
π(n − b + j) = n − b + j for j = 1, 2, . . . , b.)




xπ(i) − δ if 1 ≤ i ≤ m
xπ(i) if m + 1 ≤ i ≤ m + d
xπ(i) + mδ if m + d + 1 ≤ i ≤ m + d + , and
xπ(i) if n − b + 1 ≤ i ≤ n
for some small δ > 0 that preserves the ordering π .
We consider the effects of smoothing in several cases depending on the
value of k(µ), which is defined exactly as before except in terms of the
ordering on µ, so that
k(µ) = max
{




µπ(i) − (Q + k)√µπ(k) < 0
}
.
The proof of Lemma 2 goes through exactly as before for all cases where
k(µ) ≤ n − b so that k(µ) cannot decrease in this range. However, when
k(µ) > n − b, using the same steps and notation as in that proof, we find
that













Hence, on this range k(µ) cannot increase.
Consider the impact of smoothing in the different cases. If k(µ) = m
then exactly as in the proof of Proposition 2, g(µ) decreases, at least until
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the point where k(µ) is poised to increase. The same is true for the cases
m < k(µ) ≤ m+d and k(µ) = n−b. The remaining case is k(µ) > n−b.
In this case, apply Lemma 1 to the subvector (µπ(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n − b)
with function h(·) = √· to conclude that ∑n−bi=1 √µπ(i) increases during





µπ(i) increases during the smoothing. From (7) (appropriately
adjusted for the ordering of the µ values) we therefore conclude that g(·)
decreases during the smoothing, at least until k(µ) is poised to decrease.
Finally, exactly as in the proof of Proposition 2, the value of g remains
constant as we redefine the value of k(µ) at the point where it is poised to
increase or decrease, and this completes the proof. 
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